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[L. A. No. 19572. In Bank. Jan. 31, 1947.]
CECIL COMBS, Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES RAILWAY
CORPORATION (a Corporation),Appellant.

nl Oarriers-Passengers-Instructiona-ContributorJ Negligence.

-In an action against a street railway corporation for injnries sustained by a passenger who was standing on the
second step of a erGwded streetcar when it collided with an
automobile, it was proper to refuse an instruction that plaintiff's violation of a municipal ordinance proluDiting passengers
from riding on the steps constituted negligence &8 a matter
of law, where the instruction omitted the important qualification that such conduct might be excused under certain circumstances.
[2] Id. - Passengers-InstruetioDB-OontributoIY NegUgence.-In
an action against a street railway corporation for injuries
sustained by a passenger who was standing on the second
step of a crowded streetcar when it collided with an automobile it was proper to give an instruction that violation of
a municipal ordinance prohibiting passengers from riding on
the steps required a presumption that plaintitI was negligent,
but that sucb presumption was not conclusive and might be
overcome by "all the circumstances surrounding the event,"
where plaintiff testified that he did not notice the crowded
eondition of the rear platform until the car was proceeding
on its way, that he had unsuccessfully endeavored to make his
way into the car, and that the ear had not stopped when the
collision oeenrred.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Harold B. Jeffery,
Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by passenger on
streetcar when it collided with an automobile. Judgment
against the streetcar company, affirmed.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, E. H. Chapman and Gerold C.
Dunn for Appellant.
[1] See 4 Cal.Jur. 971; 10 Am.Jur. 291.
.
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Kelt. Dil. Beference: [1, 2] Carriers, § 149•
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Tripp, Callaway, Sampson & Dryden, Walter L. Gordon,
Jr., Lowell L. Dryden and DeWitt Morgan Manning for
Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Combs sued to recover damages for personal injuries, and the appeal of the Los Angeles Railway
Corporation attacks the judgment in his favor upon the
ground that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. As in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn SCMol Di8frict, ."te
p. 581 [177 P.2d 279], certain jury instruetions are challenged upon the ground that they incorrectly state the law in
regard to the e1rect of a plaintiif's violation of a statute upon
his cause of action for negligence.
The accident occurred when a streetcar operated by the
railway company collided with an automobile operated by
Joseph Commodore. Combs was standing on the step of the
car and the impaet threw him to the street. Be named both
the corporation and Commodore as defendants. Each of them
denied the charge of negligence and, as a separate defense,
pleaded contributory negligence.
As Combs explained the circumstances of his ease, late in
the afternoon, he and several other persons were standing
at a loading zone waiting for a streetcar. When it arrived,
he made no observation as to the number of persons which it
carried, nor did he notice that the rear platform was crowded.
However, he saw several persons riding on the rear step.
Be was the last person to board the car. Be reached the
second step and, after the car started, paid his fare to the
conductor, received a transfer, and then endeavored to make
his way to the platform. However, it was so crowded with
passengers that he could not do so. AI!. the streetcar approached
the next stop, and while Combs was still on the second step,
the car and the automobile of Commodore collided. The impaet ripped the steps from the body of the ear and Combs
received injuries for which he now claims damages.
At the conclusion of the plaintiif's ease, both defendants
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by motion for a
nonsuit based upon the claim that the evidence concluSively
established that, as a matter of law, Combs was guilty of contributory negligence. This motion was denied. Upon the same
grounds, at the close of the trial, each defendant unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict.
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The jury returned its verdict in favor of Combs and Commodore and against the railway company. The appeal of
the corporation Is from the judgment and from the order
denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The appellant contends that the evidence conclusively estabHshed that Combs was guDty of contributory negligence as
• matter of law because ofhfs violation of a sect.ion of the
Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles which makes it
1Ul1awful for one to "ride upon the fenders, steps, or rmming
board of any street car or vehicle." (§ 80.47.) And as there
is no con1lict In the testimony that Combs was "riding"
upon the steps of the streetcar in violation of the statute"
and but one eonclusion ean be drawn from the facts, the question of proximate cause is one of law.
A further ground of attack upon the judgment is that
prejudicial error l"8SUlted from the action of the trial eourt
in refusing to instruct the jury that if it found Combs had
violated the applicable ordinance, he was gunty of negligence
as a matter of Jaw. An instruction upon this point requested
by appellant and given to the jury as modified is also challenged by the raDway corporation as eonstituting prejudicial
error. Violation of the ordinance was conclusive, not preBtllDptive, evidence of negligence, since there were no eireumstances presented which would justify or excuse' violation.
Furthermore. the modified instruction was' eon1tieting, argumentative, and misleading. Also. says the appellant, the instruction given to the jury was erroneous because it faDed
to state in specific terms circumstances under which a violation of the ordinance is excused, but leaves this entire matter
solely to conjecture without reference to legal principles.
On the other hand. Combs contends that 'the issue of eontributory negligence was properly left to the jury. Be urges
that the evidence presented a question of fact as to whether
he was "riding" upon the steps of the streetcar within the
meaning of the ordinance and supports the jury's implied
bding that he was not doing so.
The instruction given by the eourt on its own motion is
defended by Combs as being a correct statement of Jaw. Considering the circumstances, he says, the violation of the ordinance created merely a presumption of negligence, and it was
• question of fact as to whether the evidence was such as to
excuse such violation.
.
The ranway company's proposed charge to the jury' reads
.. followa: "If 70U find from the evidence ••• that at ~

Jan. 1947]

OoKBS tI.

Los ANGELES RAILWAY CoRP.

609

(2P C.2d 606; 177 P.2d 293]

time of the collision between the automobile and street ear and
immediately prior thereto, .•• Combs was riding upon one or
more of the steps of said streetcar, then . • • Combs was .••
[violating] the Municipal Code ••• and as snch was guilty
of negligence as a matter of law. If you further find from
the evidence that snch negligence, if any, contributed proximately in any degree whatever, even the slightest, to the injuries snstained by . • • Combs, then [he] is not entitled to
recover .•. against defendant ••. corporation. • . ."
'The instruction given by the court as modification of one
snbmitted by the appellant is No. 149 of California Jury
Instructions, Third Revised Edition. It reads: "Conduct
which is in violation of the [Municipal] code sections just
read to you eonstitutes negligence per 16. This means that
if the evidence snpports a finding, and you do find, that any
party to this action did 80 conduct himself, it requires a presumption that he was negligent. However, snch presumption
is not conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing that under all the circumstances surrounding the event,
the eonduct in question was excusable, justifiable and such as
might reasonably have been expected from a person of ordinary prudence. In this connection you may assume that a
person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey
the law and will do so unless causes, not of his own intended
making, induce him, without moral fault, to do otherwise."
The court also advised the jury that "a presumption is a
deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from
particular facts. It may be controverted by other evidence,
direct or indirect; but unless 80 controverted, the jury is
bound to find in accordance with the presumption."
[1] These instructions present the same qnestion which
was decided in the Satterlee case, 3'Upra. The evidence concerning the injury to Combs required. first, a determination
as to whether he had violated the ordinance and. if he had
done 10, the effect of such violation. The instruction refused
by the eourt cllieotod the jury to find that, if he did not comply with the mandAte of the ordinance, he could not recover.
BeoaUII of the orntmnon of the important qualification that
snob _duct mtlht be excused under certain circumstances,
the oourt,~..~In.t~"on it was correct. (See Satterlee v. Oro/nge
91"," f,lfW{I
mprCJ, at p. 581 [177 P.2d 279].)

.......... ""'rlc',

610

CollBS 11.

Los ANGELES R.uLWAY CoRP.

[29 C.2d
1

)

[2] The instruction given by the court was a complete
and correct statement of the law. By it. the jury was first
asked to determine whether Combs was "riding" upon the
steps of the ear. In view of the testimony of Combs that he
was endeavoring to reach the rear platform and that the
streetear had traveled only a short distance before the collision, the fact of violation was correctly left to the jury. (ConMrd v. Pacific Elec. By. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 375 [94 P.2d 567J.)
If he was violating the ordinance in that particular at the
time of the accident. the jury was told, the question then to
be answered was whether the circumstances showed an excuse
for his conduct. Bearing upon that issue was the testimony'
of Combs that when he boarded the streetcar he did not make
any observation as to how many people it was carrying, that
he did not notice the crowded condition of the rear platform
until the ear was proceeding on it~ way, that he endeavored
to make his way into the car but found it was impossible to
do so. and that the ear had not stopped when the· step upon
which he was riding was struck by the automobile of Commodore. From this evidence. the jury could find that Combs
reasonably thought that the people in front of him would
soon move up into the car. but subsequent events beyond his
control prevented him from doing so.
The appellant's contention that the instruction was con1licting, argumentative, and misleading and tended to confuse
the jury is without merit. The statements in the instruction
that violation of an ordinance requires a presumption of negligence and that the presumption may be overcome by "all
the circumstances surrounding the event," are neither inconsistent nor confusing. In many other situations a jury is
,directed that, if it finds certain facts to be true, a certain
conclusion follows; however, if additional facts are found then
a different determination must be made. The challenged inI struetion does nothing more than this.
In other words, to
I tell jurors that violation of an ordinance gives rise to a rebut1table presumption of negligence is to say that they are authorI ized by the law to look behind, beyond, around and outside
the violation to see if there are circumstances that justify
or excuse the conduct. The statements merely complement
each other. This instruction, when combined with the instruc-,
.tion explaining the legal effect of a presumption, clearly states\
I the applicable principles of law announced in Satterlee v.
IOr-.g4
ScJwoZ Dillricl, mprG. It thus becomea 1IJ).-

"*'"
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necessary to decide whether a duty was owed to persons in
the class of appellant 80 that it could take advantage of a
violation of section 80.47 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code.
The verdict is an implied finding that, under the circum·
stances, the alleged violation of the ordinance was excusable
and it is amply supported by the evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

)
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CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of aftirmance, but
as the majority opinion is based upon the unsound reasoning
in the Satterlee ease, ante, p. 581 [177 P.2d 279], from
which I dissented, I cannot agree with the legal theory upon
which said opinion is based.
Once it is conceded, as it is in the majority opinion, that
the violation of a penal statute or ordinance by one seeking
to recover civil damages, does not necessarily bar a recovery,
there is no common sense or logic in talking about presumptions or presumptive negligence arising from evidence of such
violation. A person involved in an accident may be guilty
of violating several statutes or ordinances but such violations
may have no bearing upon his alleged negligent conduct. For
example, he may be driving an automobile without a driver's
license; his automobile may not have a current license number; and he may be operating his automobile at night without
a taillight and have a head-on collision. Obviously, none of
these violations can be said to have any bearing upon negligent conduct, and evidence relating to them would be immaterial and irrelevant. Even when we consider a statute or
ordinance relating to conduct directly involved in the accident, it is first a question of fact as to whether there has been
a violation, second, whether such violation was a proximate
cause of the accident, and third, if both of the foregoing are
answered in the affirmative, whether such violation was excused or justified. There must necessarily be involved in the
latter the question of whether or not the person charged with
such violation acted as a reasonably prudent person under
the circumstances. If so, he could not be guilty of negligence.
So the test must be in every case, what would a reasonably
prudent person have done under the circumstances' Apply.
: in& this test to the facts of the ease before us, I can perceive
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no basis upon which the finding in favor of plainti1f can be
reversed. It was certainly a question of fact as to whether
he acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. To say that the technical violation of an ordinance
would bar a recovery under such circumstances is too harsh
a rule for any court of justice to announce. True, the ordinance was properly introduced as evidence in the case, and its
provisions are factors to be considered by the trier of fact in
determining the issue of contributory negligence. The trier
of fact might have determined that plaintiff was guilty of a
violation of the ordinance and his conduct in so doing was not
that of a reasonably prudent person. Such a determination
would have justified a finding of contributory negligence. On
the other hand, the trier of fact might have concluded, as
it did, that notwithstanding the proof showing a violation
of the ordinance, plainti1f's conduct was that of a reasonably
prudent person, and he was not, therefore, guilty of contributory negligence. There is no sound basis for the statement
that proof of the violation of an ordinance requires a presumption that the violator was negligent. This is not the field in
which presumptions operate. They operate in the absence of
evidence of the facts of which they are themselves evidence.
(Speck v. Saf'tl6r, 20 Cal.2d 585 [128 P.2d 16]; Westberg v.
Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360,367 [94 P.2d 590J.) Here the evidence
showed just what the conduct of plainti1f was, and it was for
the trier of fact to determine from the evidence whether or
not plainti1f's conduct was that of a person of ordinary prudence. .Assuming there was evidence that plaintiff violated
the ordinance, it must be considered with the other evidence
in determining the ultimate fact. When this fact is determined either the presence or absence of contributory negligence has been established. This is accomplished without the
aid of a presumption. It was proper for the trial court to
read to the jury the provision of the Municipal Code of the
City of Loa Angeles which makes it unlawful for one to "ride
upon the fenders, steps, or running board of any street ear
or vehicle," and to advise the jury that it was the duty of
plainti1f and all other citizens to obey such provision, but in
determining whether or not plainti1f was guilty of contnDutory negligence, the jury should take into consideration all
of the evidence relating to the conduct of plaintiff at the time
of the accident, and if they determine therefrom that plaintiff'. conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person under

!
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the circumstances, he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The instruction given by the court to the jury was much
more favorable to the defendant than that which should have
been given, and in my opinion it is confusing and does not
contain a correct statement of the law. After stating that
"Conduct which is in violation of the [Municipal] code sections just read to you constitute negligence per "," it states
that if the jury should find "that any party to this action
did so conduct himself, it requires a presumption that he was
negligent." The element of proximate cause is not mentioned
in the instruction. It has been stated many times, and it must
be considered as a settled rule of law that contributory negligence which is not a proximate cause of the accident is not
a bar to recovery (Pewitt v. Biley, 27 Cal.2d 310 [163 P.2d
873]; Blanton v. Curry, 20 Ca1.2d 793 [129 P.2d 1]; Bush
v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308 [237 P. 1066]; 19 Cal.Jur. 649)
and an instruction which singles out conduct as constituting
a basis for a denial of recovery should include the element
of proximate cause.
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that any error
which existed in the instruction complained of was more favorable to defendant than to the plaintiff, and defendant could
not have suffered prejudice thereby.

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. In my opinion plainti« was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (See
my concurring opinion in Safferlee v. Orange Glenn School
Diltrict, ante, p. 581 [177 P.2d 2791.) Under the instruction given by the trial court, riding on the streetcar steps in
violation of the ordinance was merel;y evidence of negligence,
and the jury was permitted to app1;y as a standard, the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence rather than the standard
prescribed by the ordinance.
The principal issue in this case is whether the plaintiff was
-riding" on the streetcar steps in violation of the ordinance.
In Connard v. Pacific EZec. By. 00., 14 Cal.2d 375, 377-378
[94 P.2d 567], this court, construing the same or4inance, determined that the plaintiff in that case was not -"riding" on
the steps of a streetcar within the meaning of the ordinance
if he used the steps preparatory to alighting therefrom after
the car had already slowed down for • stop but "had not

_ -f
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quite come to a complete stop." In that ease the court stated:
"There is a clear distinction between the conduct of one who
over a period of time deliberately stands or 'rides' on the
steps of a moving car, and the conduct of one who merely
undertakes, after the signal to stop has been given, to use
the steps in the course of a continuous route from car seat to
station platform.. The former conduct may be a violation of
the ordinance, negligence per '6, and the latter not come
within the terms of the prohibition." Conversely, a person is
not "riding" on the steps within the meaning of the ordinance, when he uses the steps with the reasonable expectation
of proceeding directly into the streetcar without stopping on
the steps and finds that it is impossible to do so after the car
starts to move and he can no longer safely alight. On the
other hand, if he cannot reasonably expect to proceed directly
into the streetcar without stopping on the steps but stands
on the steps after the ear gets under way, even though he
intends to remain there only until such time as there is room
inside, his conduct is in violation of the ordinance. It is clear
that the ordinance was directed against the use of streetcar
steps for transportation while the car is crowded even though
a "rider" may expect to move to a proper place as soon as
it becomes available. There is greater likelihood of riding on
streetcar steps under such circumstances than when there is
ample room inside.
The uncontroverted evidence in the present ease showed that
when plaintiff boarded the steps, he could not reasonably
expect to proceed directly from the steps to the car platform
without stopping on the steps and that he stood on the steps
after the ear started with the intention of remaining there
until such time as there was room inside. Plaintiff himself
testified that before he boarded the car he knew that other
passengers were riding on the steps. He also testified that he
paid his fare and took a transfer after the ear started, thus
showing the lack of any intention to get off at the first safe
opportunity in the event he was unable to get inside. Under
the circumstances a reasonable jury could only conclude that
plaintiff was riding on the steps within the meaning of the
ordinance.
Before a verdict may be directed there must be not only a
violation of the ordinance, but a eausal relation between the
conduct in violation of the ordinance and the injuries susVJned b7 the plaintiff. The uncon:flicting evidence disclosed
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by the record shows that the automobile struck the side of the
streetcar and ripped off the steps, including the step on which
plaintiff was standing. If plaintiff had been standing on the
platform or in the interior part of the car, he would not have
been injured. No reasonable jury, therefore, could doubt that
plaintiff's conduct in violation of the ordinance was in fact
a contributing cause of his injuries.
It has been suggested that the ordinance does not provide
a proper standard of conduct to determine the question of
contributory negligence of persons riding on streetcar steps,
since its purpose is to protect the passengers from harm rather
than to protect street railways from liability. A statute or
ordinance designed for the protection of the elass of persons
that includes the plaintiff provides the standard of conduct
in determining contributory negligence, for "Unlike assumption of risk, the defense does not rest upon the idea that the
defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff. Rather
the plaintiff is denied recovery because his own conduct disentitles him to maintain the action. In the eyes of the law
both parties are at fault." (Prosser, Torts, § 898; see Rest.,
Torts, § 466, comment f.) The purpose of the ordinance in
question was to protect the users of streetcars from injuries
like that sustained by plaintiff. Violation of a duty to protect oneself, including a duty imposed by statute, constitutes
contributory negligence. (M eincke v. Oakland Garage, Inc.,
11 Ca1.2d 255, 256 [79 P.2d 911; Koeppel v. Daluiso, 118 Cal
App. 442, 446 [5 P.2d 4571; see Connard v. Pacific Elec. By.
Co., supra, at 376; Rest. Torts, §§ 469, 475.)
Since the uncontradicted evidence I'Ihowed that plaintiff was
contributively negligent as a matter of Jaw and that this negligence was a contributing cause of plaintiff's injuries, defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
27, 1947. Traynor, J. voted for a rehearing•

.

,

)

